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THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY AND REGULATION
Richard A. Posner*
I
When an industry is monopolized, price rises above and output
falls below the competitive level. Those who continue to buy the
product at the higher price suffer a loss, L in Figure 1, but this
loss is exactly offset by the additional revenue that the monopolist
obtains by charging the higher price. Other consumers, who are
deflected by the higher price to substitute goods, suffer a loss,
D, that is not offset by gains to the monopolist. This is the
"deadweight lossH from monopoly, and in conventional analysis the
only social cost of monopoly——L being regarded merely as a transfer
from consumers to owners of the monopoly seller. D, however,
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underestimates the social costs of monopoly. The existence
of an opportunity to obtain monopoly profits will attractresources
into efforts to obtain monopolies, and theopportunity costs of those
resources are social costs of monopoly too. Theft provides an
instructive analogy. The transfer of wealth from victim to thiefdoes
not involve an artificial limitation of output, but it does not
follow that the social cost of theft is zero. The existence ofthe
opportunity to make such transfers draws resources into thieving and
in turn into protection against theft, and theopportunity costs of
the resources consumed are social costs of theft.
This type of analysis has long been familiar ina few special contexts. For
example, Plant's criticism of the patent system, made a generation
ago, was based on the effect of the patent monopoly in drawing greater
resources into invention than into activities that yield only corn—
petitive returns. And Telser's theory of resale price maintenance
was in the same vein. However, although the tendency of monopoly
1. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies andTheft,
5 W. Econ. J. 224 (1967).
2. If, however, a thief took three radios from a hcfne and on theway
out dropped one, which broke, this loss would correspond to the dead-
weight loss of monopoly.
3.Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. Pol. Econ. 169, 171 n.3 (1968); Gordon Tullock,supra note 1.
There is another possible source of social cost from theft--the
value of the stolen goods may be less to the thief than to thevictim.
4. The Economic Theory concerning Patents, 1 Economica (n.s.) 30(1934).
5.Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. Law & Econ. 86
(1960). Cf. George J. Stigler, Price and NonpriceCompetition, in his
The Organization of Industry 23 (1968).
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rents to be transformed into costs is clearly no longer a novel
insight, its implications both for the measurement of the aggregate
socialcosts of monopoly and for a variety of other important issues
relating to monopoly and public regulation (including tax policy)
continue to be ignored. Studies of the costs of monopoly still focus
exclusively on the deadweight loss (plus alleged consequences of
monopoly that have no firm theoretical basis, such as "X-inefficiency");
analyses of public policy toward monopolies (both private and govern-
mentally induced) continue to ignore the social costs involved in
obtaining monopoly power.
The present paper is an effort to rectify this neglect. Part II
presents a simple model of the social costs of monopoly, conceived as
the sum of the deadweight loss and the additional loss resulting from
the competition to become a monopolist. Part III uses the model to
estimate the social costs of monopoly in the United States, and the
socialbenefits of antitrust enforcement. Part IV exploresthe implica-
tions of theanalysis for a variety of issues relating to monopoly
andpublic regulation, such as public policy toward price discrimination
and the choice between income and excise taxation.
II.
Imake (and later will defend) two simplifying assumptions. The
first is that becoming a monopolist is a competitive activity and hence
that the expected profit from obtaining a monopoly is zero. Firms
seeking monopoly expend resources until the last dollar spent increases
the expected value of having a monopoly by one dollar. The second4.
assumption is that the costs of becoming a monopolist are constant, so
that the sum of the opportunity costs of becoming a monopolist is equal
to the expected value of the monopoly. With these assumptions,





-AQ),the relative sizes of D and
L are given by
r2(Qc_AQ)
This ratio can also be expressed in terms of the elasticity of demand
for the product in question at the competitive price (e), and the
percentage increase in price brought about by monopolization (p):
D_ P
2 E2(i) E
Itmay be objected that the assumption that the monopolist's
price increase is determined independently of the elasticity of demand
is inconsistent with the assumption that he is a rational profit—
maximizer. Profit maximization does assume that the monopolist's
price is a function of the elasticity of the demand curve facing him,
but a firm's demand curve may be different from the industry's demand
curve, to which Einequation (2) refers. For example, the demand
6.Another assumption, which does not affect the ana1ysis is that
the monopoly is enjoyed for one period only; otherwise the optimum
.'penditures on obtaining a monopoly could not be compared directly
with L in Figure 1.
7. This is strictly accurate only for a linear demand curve; it is
only an approximation for nonlinear demand curves. The significance
of this qualification is consider later.
8. p ELW/PC Thesign of Eispositive in equations (2) and (3).
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curve facing the individual seller in a cartelized industry will
almost certainly be more elastic than the demand curve for the
industry,because the cartel will not be able to eliminate all com-
petition amongits members. As a result, the actual prices charged
by the cartel will be lower than the profit-maximizing level as
determined with reference to the elasticity of the industry demand
curve. It seems quite likely that, due to the imperfections of
cartelization (especially in industries subject to the Sherman Act)
and of cartel-like forms of public regulation, the prices actually
charged in many monopolized industries will be lower than the optimum
monopoly price for the industry.
From equation (2), it is plain that the ratio of the deadweight
loss of monopoly to the loss that results from the competition to
become a monopolist (what we may call the "additional loss" of monopoly)
is smaller, the less elastic the demand for the product in question
at the competitive price. For example, at c =1,a one per cent increase
in price over the competitive level will result in a deadweight loss
equal to about .5 per cent of the additional loss; at c =2,this
figure is about orper cent; at E= --, itis only about .025 per cent.
C, the total social costs of monopoly, is equal to
D+L=pR_PAQ=R(p_.cp2),!! (3)
9•Rc is total sales revenues at the competitive price.6.
and is higher, the larger the scale of the industry as measured by its S
sales revenues at the competitive output, and the less elastic the demand
for the product at that output. At c =1,a one per cent increase in
price above the competitive level will yield a total social cost of
monopoly equal to .995 per cent of the industry's revenues at the
competitive price and level. At c =2,the total social cost falls to
.99 per cent of the industry's revenues atthe competitive price and
level, while at c =thepercentage rises to .9975. The costs Qf
monopoly are maximized when demand is totally inelastic at the com-
petitive price.
These formulas are accurate only for small changes in the price
levels for larger changes, e, which measures elasticity at a point,
can no longer be used. And monopolization might result in large price
the middle term of 5 increases. Hence the general formulas, (1) and/(3), remain important.
For purposes of empirical estimation, it will be helpful to derive
two additional formulas: one for the case where the deadweight loss,
the elasticity of demand, and the monopoly price increase are known
and the elasticity of demand is assumed to be constant, and the other
for the case where the monopoly price increase, the monopoly output,
and the elasticity of demand at the monopoly price are known and the
demand curve is assumed to the linear.
(1) For constant elasticity, since = andQ= a)mE,]i2L
andtherefore AQ = -





where k P/P. Equation (4) can be simplified to
=(kEfl (5)
From (5), we can readily deduce that C is equal to
1C




where Rm is total sales revenue at the monopoly price and output.
A question aries whether, since a demand curve of constant
elasticity is nonlinear, the linear approximation of the deadweight
loss used in equations (5) and (6) introduces a source of serious









The following table compares D/L calculated from equation (5) (with
c =-1)and equation (7), and shows that the linear approximation
overestimates the deadweight loss, but not seriously.
11. For the special case where the firm is able to charge the optimuii
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andequation (6) becomes





P D/L (ratio of deadweight to additional loss)






The partial derivatives of D/L in equation (4) withrespect to k
and6are
6-1 (D/L) — 6k (D/L)— ikEl k 8
—
2' c 2
a(D/L)/k is negative since c is negative,meaning that the ratio of the —
deadweightloss of monopoly to the additional loss issmaller, the
smaller the monopoly price increase (k, the ratio of the competitive
to the monopoly price, is larger the smaller the relativeprice increase).
3(D/L)/e is also negative (since the natural logarithm ofa fraction
is negative), meaning that the ratio of thedeadweight to the additional
loss of monopoly is greater, the more elastic thedemand is.
the
(2) For the case where/elasticity of demand at themonopoly price
(as well as the monopoly price increase and thequantity sold at the
monopoly price) is known or can be computed, and it is believed that
the demand curve can be approximated by astraight line, we first




Sincethe slope of a linear demand curve is constant, we can use




and D/L is given by
0—E(l—k)
L 2
We now have two formulas for the ratio of the deadweight to the
additional loss from monopoly-—equations (5) and (ll)——and we ask:
how different are the estimates that they produce, under variousassump-
tions as to the monopoly price increase and the elasticity of demand?
The answer is, not very, for price increases of less than 25per cent,
and even for much larger price increases if the elasticity of demand is
no greater than one. These results are shown in Figure 2.
III
A
The formulas developed in the preceding part could be used to derive,
fromthe estimates used by Arnold Harberger and others of the deadweight
12. The sign of c is positive in equations (10) and (11).
13.For thespecial case where the firm is able to charge the optimum
monopolyprice, equation (10) becomes simply
-R
(10')
and equation (11) becomes
2. (11')





loss of monopoly, an estimate of the total social cost of monopoly.
Harberger, estimating an average monopoly price increase of about
six per cent and assuming that the elasticity of demand was constant
and equal to -1, found the deadweight loss from monopoly in the manu-
facturing sector to be equal to (at most) .1 per cent of GNP.
Harberger's (implicit) k is thus 1/1.06 or .9434, and from this and
his estimate of c, we calculate from equation (5) that the ratio of
0 to L in Harberger's analysis is .03. Hence if D is .1 per cent of
GNP, L is about 3.3 per cent and C about 3.4 per cent—-about $40
billion today. David Schwartzman used similar methods and found D
equal to about .1 per cent of GNP too. Buthe assumed a price
increase of 8.3 per cent and an c =-1.5.Plugging these values into
equation (5) yields D/L =.06.Hence if D =.1per cent of GNP, L =
1.7per cent and C about 1.8 per cent.
However, neither estimate can be taken seriously because both
Harberger and Schwartzman, in determining the monopoly price increase,
relied on rate-of-return statistics. Above-average rates of return
were used not only to identify the monopolized industries but also to
calculate the monopoly price increase. If the analysis in this paper
is correct, such a procedure is improper. The monopolist is not
expected to enjoy a supernormal rate of return, but only the normal
14. Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 Am.
Econ. Rev. Papers and Proceedings 77 (1954), reprinted in his Taxation
and Welfare 91 (1974).
15. The Burden of Monopoly, 68 J. Pol. Ecón. 627 (1960).12.
return (assuming, realistically, that the investment which he
makes in obtaining the monopoly is written off over the life of the
monopoly). '11'Thispoint is distinct from the objections to Harberger's
procedure raised by Goerge Stigler: that monopoly profits are often
capitalized into the valuation of a firm's assets and that some of
the profits may be received as rents by suppliers of the firm's
inputs.
The proper method of calculating the social costs of monopoly
(deadweight plus additional loss) is to obtain estimates of the mono-
poly price increase, and of the elasticity of demand at the relevant
points along the demand curve, from industry studies. An independent
estimate of the elasticity of demand would of course be unnecessary
if we could assume that, after the price increase, the price
charged was the optimum monopoly price; and where an independent
estimate of Eisavailable, it can serve as a check on that assumption.
To illustrate, there have been a number of estimates of the percentage
by which CAB regulation has increased the price of airline travel. The
is .66.19,
simple average of these estimates / —Ifa 66 per cent price increase
16. Subject to an important qualification, discussed later, when there
is uncertainty in the market for becoming a monopolist.
17. Thus, if it costs $10 million to obtain a monopoly that will yield
a profit (net of the cost of production and sale) of $1 million a year
for 10 years, we can expect the annual expenses of the company to be
adjusted upward, by depreciation or other accounting techniques, by
$1 million a year throughout the 10-year period.
18. George J. Stigler, The Statistics of Monopoly and Mergers, 64
J. Pol. Econ. 33 (1956).
19. Computed from Richard E. Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators
372 (1962); William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America 110—li,
124-25 (1970); Note, Is Regulation Necessary?, California Air Trans-
portation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 Yale L. 3. 1416, 1435—36
(1965).13.
over competitive levels is assumed to raise the price of air travel
to the optimum monopoly level, then the elasticity of demand at
the monopoly price can be calculated from the formula which equates
marginal cost to marginal revenue, MC = + ). SinceMC =
and =6m'
c =-2.5at the monopoly price. An independent
estimate of the long-run elasticity of demand for air travel made by
Houthakker and Taylor is -2.36, which is virtually identical t.c
our calculation.
We havE two choices now. We can assume constant elasticity and
solve for OIL using equation (5'), or we can assume a linear demand
curve and solve for Oil., using equation (10'). With the assumption of
constant elasticity, D2.04 L, and (from equation (6')) it is readily
calculable that the total social cost of the airline monopoly is
approximately equal to 2.48 times the total revenue at the monopoly
price.
However, the assumption of a linear demand curve seems more plaus-
ible than the assumption of constant elasticity, especially for large
relative price increases, which one expects to find associated with a
rising elasticity of demand as substitutes become increasingly attractive.
20. This was essentially the procedure used by David Kamerschen, in An
Estimation of the Welfare Losses from Monopoly in the American Econciy,
4 W. Econ. J. 221 (1966), to estimate the deadweight loss from monopoly
in manufacturing. He has been criticized, and rightly so, for assuming
that firms in concentrated industries subject to the Sherman Act's
prohibition of collusive pricing are typically able to charge the
profit-maximizing monopoly price.
21. H. S. Houthakker & Lester D. Taylor, Consumer Demand in the United
States, 1929-1970, at 124 (1966). This must be the elasticity of demand
at the regulated price, since only a small part of the airline indus-
try is not subject to CAB regulation.14.
And if equations (10') and (11')are used, D is one half as greatas
L, and C is equal to 20 per cent of thetotal revenues of the indus-
try at the monopoly price. Still, thisindicates a very large social
loss from the regulation_inducedairline monopoly.
The foregoing exercise brings outan important general point that
has been completely ignored inprevious studies of the cost of monopoly
to the economy: much of this costprobably originates in the regulated
sector of the economy. The ability of firmsto maintain supracompetjtjve
prices must be greater in industries in
which a regulatory agency limits
entry and price competition than in themanufacturing sector where
express collusion is forbidden by the Sherman Act.Yet all of the
previous studies of the cost ofmonopoly to the economy have been based
on supposed monopoly pricing inmanufacturing alone.
Table 2 collects estimates of the
regulation—induc price increase,
and the elasticity of demand at thecurrent price, for several industries
for which these data are available.Two estimates of elasticity are
given; one (ci) is derived from theprice-Increase data, on theassump-
tion that the industry is
charging the optimum monopoly price,and the
other (c2) is an independent estimateof elasticity. The estimates
of the total social costs of theregulation in question, which appear
in the last two columnsof thetable, are based on the assumption
that the industry's demandcurve is linear in the relevant region, and
are expressed as a percentage of the totalrevenues of the industry.
Our airline exampleappears in the last row of the table.
22.C1 is computed from c1 C2 from
c2.Table 2




Physicians' services •67a —1.43 .29 .35
Eyeglasses •34c — .13 .24
Milk •11e .05 .10
Motor carriers •62g -2.63 .19 .30
Oil .65' -2.5 —.9' .20 .32
Airlines .66 -2.5 —2.36 .20 .19
a Unpublished study by Reuben A. Kessel.
b.H. S. Houthakker & Lester D. Taylor, Consumer Demand in the United
States, 1929—1970, at 99 (l966)(short—run).
c Lee Benham, Price Structure and Professional Control of Information,
p. 19 (March 1973).
d Id, at 30 (simple average).
e Reuben Kessel, Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk
Markets, 10 J. Law & Econ. 51, 73 (1967).
f H. S. Houthakker, New Evidence on Demand Elasticities, 33 Econometrica
277, 286 (1965). This estimate is for all food; an estimate limited to
dairy products in the Netherlands was not significantly different. Robert
Ayaynian, A Comparison of Barten's Estimated Demand Elasticities With
Those Obtained Using Forsch's Method, 37 Econometrica 79 (1969).
g Average of estimates in Department of Agriculture studies cited in
Thomas Gale Moore, Freight Transportation Regulation 72 (American Enter-
prise Institute 1972); Richard N. Farmer, The Case for Unregulated
Truck Transportation, 46 J. Farm [con. 398 (1964).
h Simpleaverages of variousestimates for transportation in Scandinavia.
SeeRegnarForsch, A Complete Scheme for Computing All Direct Costs and
Cross Demand Elasticities in a Model With Many Sectors, 27 Econometrica
177 (1959); Richard W, Parks, Systems of Demand Equations: An Empirical
Comparison of Alternative Functional Forms, 37 Econometrica 629, 649 (1969).
i Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil Import Question (1970).
15.16.
These estimates are crude, although they have the virtue of being
improvable. They do suggest, however, that the social costs of regula-
tion are probably extremely high, given that about 17 per cent of GNP
comes from industries such as agriculture, transportation, communica-
tions, power, banking, insurance, and medical services that contain
the sorts of controls over competition that might be expected to lead
to supracompetitive prices. True, a much higher percentage of GNP--
30 per cent——originates in manufacturing and mining, a highly concen-
trated sector of the economy, and the conventional wisdom associates
high concentration with supracompetitive pricing. But only about a
fifth of the output of this sector comes from industries in which four
firms account for 60 per cent or more of sales, and there is little
theoretical basis for believing that the sellers in less concentrated
industries could collude effectively without engaging in behavior pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act. ?_1 Not all violations of the Sherman Act
are detected and punished, of course, but the secret conspiracies
that escape detection are probably not very effective-—even the great
electrical conspiracy, a highly elaborate and long-continued conspiracy
23. This figure may seem an overstatement, since not all of the markets
in the regulated industries are in fact subject to the relevant regula-
tory controls (almost half of the trucking industry, for example, is
exempt from regulation by the ICC). On the other hand, tariffs and
similar restrictions (g,, the oil import quotas) are excluded from
the estimate of the percentage of GNP affected by regulation.
24. Thus, Kessel's study of underwriting costs shows that an increase
beyond eight in the number of bids does not reduce those costs; and
an industry where the four largest firms have less than 60 per cent of
the market is apt to contain at least eight significant competitors.
Reuben Kessel, A Study of the Effects of Competition in the Tax-Exempt
Bond Market, 79 J. Pol. Econ. 706, 723 (1971).
.17.
among a very small group of firms, apparently succeeded inraising
the price level by only 8.8 per cent onaverage. It seems highly
unlikely that the price level of the manufacturing andmining sector
as a whole is more than about two per cent above thecompetitive level'
Assume that it is two, and that theaverage elasticity of demand for the
products of this sector, at current prices, is -1.1607. Then, from
equation (10), the total social costs of monopoly in thissector are 1.9
per cent of the total revenues generated in the sector,and while this is
substantial, it amounts to a total dollar losssubstantially smaller
than that generated in the regulatedsector.
25, U.S. Cong.., Jt. Comm. on Internal RevenueTaxation, Staff Study of
Income Tax Treatment of Treble Damage PaymentsUnder the Antitrust
Laws 39 (Nov. 1, 1965).
26. If itisassumed that only in industries where the four-firmcon-
centration ratio exceeds .6 is effective undetectablecollusion likely, and that it allows these industries tomaintain, on average, prices five
per cent above the competitive level, while in the rest of themanufac-
turing and mining sector the average price level isonly one per cent
above the competitive level, thenaverage prices for the entire sector
would only be 1.83 per cent above thecompetitive price level. (Statistics
on the distribution of output among industries in differentfour-firm
concentration ratio groups are from the 1963 Census ofManufacturers.)
27. This figure is a simpleaverage of the long-run price elasticities
for nine product groups within themanufacturing and mining sector
estimated by Houthakker & Taylor,supra note 21, at 72, 74, 83, 112-14,
116, 128—31.
28. The simple average of the social—costestimates presented in Table
2 is 20.4 per cent of the total revenues of theregulated industry.
Assuming that 50 per cent of the output of that sector isproduced in
markets that are regulated in a manner similarto the industries in
Table 2 and that the average social cost ofregulation in each such
market is 20.4 per cent of totalrevenue, then it would follow that the
social costs of regulation were equal to 1.7per cent of GNP, while the
social costs of monopoly in manufacturing andmining would be equal to
only .6 per cent of GNP. These estimates exclude, ofcourse, the admin-
istrative costs of regulation and antitrustenforcement in the two sectors
respectively, and the benefits of monopoly. The benefitsare likely to
be greater in the manufacturing andmining sector, where much concentration
and the resulting monopolypricing may be due to efficiencies of various18.
Another usetowhich the analysis developed here can be put is
estimating the social benefits of the antitrust laws. Table 3, which
is constructed on the same basis as Table 2, presents estimates of the
socialcosts of several cartels not subject to the prohibitions of
the American antitrust laws.
Table3
Social Costs of Cartelization
Cartel
C Industry Price Increase c1 2
Nitrogen 75a -2.325614493b .21 .30
Sugar -4.3276 339d .12 .22
Aluminum -2 n.a. 25
Aluminum —3.6311 n.a. .14
Rubber 100g -2 n.a. .25
Electric bulbs 37h —3.7023 n.a. .14
Copper 3l' -4.2499 n.a. .12
a George W. Stocking & Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action 163 (1946).
b Id. at 166.
c Id. at 46.
d H.S. Houthakker, New Evidence on Demand Elasticities, 33 Econometrica
277, 286 (1965) (food --obviously a much too low estimate for one food
product sold at a cartel price:).
e Stocking & Watkins, supra note a, at 228.
f Id. at 251.
g Id. at 64—65.
h Id. at 343.
i.George W. Stocking & Myron W. Watkins, Cartels or Competition? 127
(1948).
28. continued
sorts.See Harold Demsetz, IndustryStructure, Market Rivalry, and
PublicPolicy, 16J. Law&Econ.1(1973). Thereis no accepted theory
whichattributes socj1 benefits torequlation limiting entry and
price competition; OUtSeenote 29 inf?'a.19.
Presumably, collusive price increases of this magnitude, andthe
attendant very substantial social costs, are deterredby the American
antitrust laws. However, a complete cost-benefitanalysis of antitrust
law would also require estimation of (1) thecosts of administering
the antitrust laws and (2) the large socialcosts imposed by the many
perverse applications of those laws, which may be an inevitableby-
product of having antitrust laws.
The conclusions that emerge from our estimationexercises are
necessarily tentative; they are that:
1. the social costs of public regulation, in
increasing prices
in the regulated industries abovecompetitive levels, are
probably very great--perhaps two per cent of our entireGNP;
2. the social costs of monopoly inmanufacturing and mining
are, in contrast, probably much smaller even though alarger sector of the economy is affected;
3. the enforcement of the antitrust lawsagainst cartels has
probably generated large social-cost savings, but at what
cost we do not know.
B
The validity of the approach of thispaper, and of the estimates
presented in the preceding subpart, depend, ofcourse, on the soundness
of our basic assumptions that the market forbecoming a monopolist is a20.
competitive one and that marginal costs in that marketare constant;
and it is time we examined thoseassumptions critically. The first
is a standard assumption of economics,and, pending better evidence
than we have, seems reasonable in thepresent context. Anyone can
try to obtain a patent, a certificate of publicconvenience and
necessity, a television license, a minimum—wage law, andanyone can
try to enter a cartelized industry, or if he isa member of such an
industry try to engross a greater share of themonopoly profits of
the industry. To be sure, where thereare no barriers to entry the
expenditure of resources on becoming a monopolist willlead to an
increase in the output of the market anda consequent reduction in
price. But these situations are properlyanalyzed as ones where the
expected monopoly profits are small and hence where thesocial costs
of monopoly are small too.
As one example of the mechanismsby which the potential transfer
of wealth from consumers to the owners of a monopolistic firm is
transformed into a social cost, considernonprice competition in the
airline industry. Assume that the CABplaces a floor under airline
prices that exceeds the marginal cost ofproviding air transportation
under competitive conditions. If theregulation is not anticipated, the
situation initially is as depicted inFigure 3, and is unstable. Since
there are several airlines, andnonprice competition is not constrained,
the airlines will expend resourceson such competition (better service,
etc.) until the marginal costs of airtransportation rise to the level
(p in Figure 3) where the industry isearning only a normal return.
S21.
MCaA1Figure3
(Judging from the profit statements and stock prices of theregulated
airlines, their return is indeed no higher than normal.)By this
process, the monopoly profit initially generated by the regulatory
price floor--the shaded rectangle-—is transformed intohigher costs
for the industry, and these costs are a social cost ofregulation.
The demand curve shifts to the right because the increasedexpendi-
tures on service presumably improve the product from thestandpoint
of the consumer. The shift produces some additionalconsumer surplus
butnot enough to offset the higher costs—-otherwise thehigher level
of service would have been provided without thespur of monopoly
pricing.
This discussion suggests animportant (and familiar) point about
expenditures on monopolizing. If for some reason the free market is
not expected to produce the optimum output of aparticular good or
service, the creation of a monopoly in that marketmay, by attracting
29. This does suggest, however, that not all of thesocial costs of
airline regulation estimated in Part III A,supra, represent pure waste.
p22.
additional resources into the market, result in the correctoutput
of the good. This is the economic justification of thepatent system
and the (nonmonopolistic) explanation for resale pricemaintenance;
it is not a justification for the regulation of the airlineindustry.
Observe that if the regulatory price floor had been anticipated,
the initial cost curve in Figure 3 would be incorrectly drawn. The
airlines would have bid away the anticipated monopoly profits in
jockeying for admission to the regulatory cartel.
Figure 3 also illustrates the second critical assumption underlying
our analysis, the constancy of the marginal costs of becoming a mono-
polist. The assumption seems appropriate in most contexts——there
seems little reason to believe that obtaining monopolies involves the
use of resources the long—run supply of which is inelastic. Some
exceptions are discussed in the next part of the paper.
How is the analysis affected if there is uncertainty in theactivity
of becoming a monopolist or if bribery is the method used to obtain the
monopoly? Given uncertainty, the expected monopoly profits ofany
firm seeking a monopoly will be smaller than the actualmonopoly profits,
and therefore the expenditures of each firm will also be smaller than
the actual monopoly profits. Suppose ten firms are vying fora monopoly
having a present value of $1 million and each of them has an equal
chance of obtaining it.If risk neutral, each will spend $100,000
(assuming constant costs) on trying to obtain the monopoly. Onlyone
30. With rising marginal costs, the total social costs ofbecoming a
monopolist would be less than the private social costs =expected
monopoly profits; the difference would be rents received by suppliers
of resources specialized to the activity of obtaining monopolies.23.
will succeed, and his costs will be much smaller thanthe monopoly
profits. But the total costs of obtaining themonopoly--counting
losers' expenditures as well as winners'--wil] be thesame as under
certainty——$l million.
If we assume that the market for monopoly is characterizedby a
high degree of uncertainty--a plausible assumption--wecan explain
why the costs of obtaining a monopoly have largely eludedobservation.
Most of the costs are incurred in unsuccessful effortsto obtain a
monopoly--the lobbying campaign that fails, the unsuccessfulattempt
to obtain a bank charter or form a cartel. Thispoint also suggests
that the use of above-average accounting rates ofreturn to identify
(though not measure) monopoly power may not beentirely unsound after
all. The firm (or industry) that obtainsmonopoly under conditions
of uncertainty will, like the winner of alottery, enjoy windfall
profits ex post.
It might seem that where monopoly is obtainedby bribery of
government officials, the additional loss of monopoly with which this
paper is concerned would be eliminated--a bribe is a pure transfer.
But this conclusion would be incorrect.Bribery merely shifts the
monopoly profits from the monopolist to the officialsreceiving the
bribe, and draws real resources into the activity ofbecoming an
offical who is in a position to receive these bribes.
Iv
The analysis of the costs of monopolypresented in this paper has
implications for a number of issues of publicpolicy.24.
1.In a recent paper Comanor and Smileyattempt to show that a
large part of the inequality in the distribution ofwealth in contem-
porary America is attributable to monopoly. They use the Harberger
and other studies discussed in Part III of thispaper to determine the
aggregate wealth transfer from consumers to theowners of monopoly firms,
and by a series of additional assumptionsconcerning the incomes of
consumers and shareholders, family size, thesavings rate, etc., derive
an estimate of the distributive impact ofmonopoly. Many of the assump-
tions are questionable but even if theircorrectness were conceded the
conclusion would be wrong. There is noreason for thinking that mono-
poly has a significant distributive effect. Consumers'wealth is not
transferred to the shareholders of monopolyfirms; it is dissipated in
the purchase of inputs into theactivity of becoming a monopolist.
2, Oliver Williamson has argued that therefusal of the courts to
recognize a defense of economies of scale inmerger cases under the
Clayton Act is questionable because, underplausible assumptions con-
cerning the elasticity of demand, only a small reductionin the merging
firms' costs is necessary to offsetany deadweight loss created by the
price increase that the merger enables the firmsto make. The
nature of the comparison is shown inFigure 4.
31. William S. Comanor & obert H.Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution
of Wealth, forthcoming in the Quarterly Journalof Economics.
32. Economics as an Antitrust Defense: TheWelfare Tradeoffs, 58
Am. Econ. ev. 18 (1968).
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Figure4
This analysis is incomplete, however. The expected profits of
the merger—-ABEF-—will generate an equivalent amount of costsas
firmsvie, through service competition or whatever, to engross these
profits (alternatively, the merging firms might expend resources equal
tothe rectangle in attempting to negotiate themerger, convince the
government to permit them to make it, or contest an antitrust case
brought to prevent or undo the merger). The total social cost of the
merger, at least as a first approximation, is ABEF +BCDand exceeds
the cost savings (GDEF) made possible by themerger. Of course, the
curves could be drawn in such a way that the merger would generate net
cost savings. My point is only that there is no presumption that anti-
competitive mergers generate net savings and this, combined with the
high cost of litigating issues of cost savings, provides some justifica-
tionfor the refusal of the courts to admit a defense of efficiencies
ina Clayton Act merger case.
3.Itisfrequentlyargued that the antitrust laws should not
concernthemselves with practices that are merely methods of price




increase.the deadweight loss of monopoly, and itmay reduce it (to
zero, if discrimination is perfect). Theconclusion may be
justifiable by reference to the costs ofadministering antidiscrjmjna—
tion rules, but the basis on which it hasbeen defended by its pro-
ponents is incorrect. Even when price discriminationis perfect, so
that the deadweight loss of monopoly iszero, the total social costs
of a discriminating monopoly aregreater than those of a single—price
monopoly. This is because, under perfect. pricediscrimination,
C is the entire area between the demandcurve and the marginal (=average)
cost curve, and must exceed the sum of L and Dat any single price
(see Figure 1).
4. It is widely believed that thecase for antitrust enforcement
has been gravely weakened by thetheory of the second best. The theory
teaches that the elimination of onemonopoly in an economy containing
othermonopolies (or other sources of divergence betweenprice and
marginal cost , such as taxation)may reduce the efficiency of resource
allocation;hence antitrust enforcementmay increase rather than reduce
D. The true economic basis for antitrustenforcement, however, is not
D but D +L,and we have seen that under plausibleassumptions as to
the elasticity of demand D is onlya small fraction of D +L,at least
for moderate increases in price above thecompetitive level. The social
costs measured by L, like the social costs oftheft, are largely unaffected
by the existence of second—best problems.
33. This is a major theme in Ward S.Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust
Law (1973).
34.I abstract from the costs ofadministering the price-discrimination
scheme; these increase the costs of discriminatingmonopoly relative to those of a nondiscriminating monopoly.27.
This discussion implies thatmonopolizing would be a socially
undesirable activity even if D werezero, and this is correct. Criminal
or socially undesirable activitymay in fact be defined as activity
that does not add to the social wealth, butmerely transfers it invol-
untarily.--"Monopoly,like theft, is unproductive ofanything other
than involuntary wealth transfers, and henceany resources devoted to
obtaining monopoly are socially wasted.
5. The analysis in thispaper suggests a possible explanation
for the positive correlation that has beenfound between concentration
and advertising (I assume, without muchconviction, that the studies
finding such a correlation will withstand the assaultsof their critics).
It may be easier to collude on price thanon the amount of advertising.
Although there is no great trick to establishingan agreed-upon level
of advertising and detecting departures fromit, the incentives to violate
any such agreement are strong because the gains froma successful adver-
tising campaign may be difficult to offsetimediately and hence offer
promise of a more durable advantage than aprice cut would.If so, the
situation is similar to nonpricecompetition in the airline industry.
Price is fixed by the cartel but the level ofadvertising is not, or
at least not effectively. As a result, themonopoly profits generated
bythe cartel price aretransformed into additional expenditureson
35. Some pure wealth transfersmay, of course, be socially desirable.
But presumably public redistribution isboth more efficient and more
equitable than the redistribution brought aboutby criminal activity.
36. Subject to the qualification statedearlier in the discussion of
patent monopolies.
37. See g., obert B. Ekelund, Jr. &William P. Gramm, Advertising
and Concentration: Some NewEvidence, 15 Antitrust Bull. 243 (1970).28.
advertising. Therefore we can expect, other things beingequal, to
find more advertising in cartelized than incompetitive industries.
6. In discussions of the "socialresponsibility" of large corpora-
tions, it is generally assumed that a firm (ora group of firms) having
some monopoly power could decide to incur somewhathigher costs in
order to discharge its social responsibilities,without courting bank-
ruptcy. Thus, glancing back at Figure 1, even if MCrose to P, the
firm would still be covering its costs.However, if the analysis in
this paper is correct, and the expectedprofits of monopolizing are
zero, it follows that the entire area L in Figure 1 willrepresent
fixed costs to the firm, unless themonopoly was obtained under con-
ditions of uncertainty. In the latter case the fixedcosts will be
somewhat lower, but in the former caseany increase in MC will place
the firm in danger of bankruptcy.
7. If one views the activity of obtainingmonopolies as a competi-





The number of potential monopolies in theeconomy is plotted on
the horizontal axis and the value of eachmonopoly on the vertical.
The demand curve has a negative slope,on the theory that there is
not an unlimited supply of lucrativemonopolies. Our earlier assump-
tion of constant costs is abandoned, and the
supply (marginal cost)
curve is shown as having a positive slope.
The intersection of the demand andsupply curves determines the
output of monopolies (Q). The totalrevenues of monopoly, VQ (equivalent
to L in Figure 1), are equal to the totalprivate (although now not the
total social) costs of the activity ofobtaining monopolies. It is
plain from Figure 5 that the social costs ofmonopoly can be reduced in
any of three ways: by reducing the average value ofa monopoly (as
by eliminating regulatory barriers to entry);by increasing the marginal
costs of obtaining a monopoly; and byreducing the elasticity of the
supply of inputs into that activity.
This analysis provides a framework foranalyzing a variety of public
policy issues, such as the recurrent proposal toreplace the present
method of assigning television licenses (awardedto the applicant who
convinces the FCC in a formal hearing of hissuperior ability to serve
the "public interest") by an auctionsystem. This proposal is frequently
supported on distributive grounds--why should the licenseerather than
the public receive the rents due to thelimited amount of
spectrum that has been allocated for television? This
paper suggests
38. The social costs are the area underthe supply curve to the left
of Q.30.
a nondistributive justification for the auctionproposaL The auction
wouldsubstitute a transfer payment for a realcost--the expenditures
on the hearing process by competingapplicants. To be sure, there
is a danger that the auction mechanismmight be subverted by expendi-
tures designed to rig the bidding. Anapplicant would be willing to
expend in real resources up to the amount of the transfer
that would be necessary to obtain thelicense, in order to obtain the
license without having to make thetransfer. However, such expendi-
tures could be discouraged by
appropriate legal penalties. ---''The
objective of punishment would be to increasethe expected costs of
obtaining the license (other than by an honestbid), which includes any
expected punishment costs, to the point where theapplicants are induced
to make the costless transfer rather thanto expend real resources on
trying to obtain the license outside of the auctionprocess.
The patent laws embody a somewhat similar
economizing technique.
Were there no such laws, inventors wouldexpend substantial resources
on preserving the secrecy of their inventions;their efforts would
generate indirect as well as direct social costsby retarding the
spread of knowledge. The patent laws, byproviding a legal remedy for
39. To be sure, the enforcement oflegal penalties is not a costless
activity. However, at least in principle, theprivate marginal cost
of criminal activity can be raised toarbitrarily high levels far
exceeding the expected value of that activity to thecriminal, at
negligible cost, by establishing a schedule ofpenalties that are so
severe that even though only slightresources are devoted to detection
and punishment of criminals theexpected punishment cost faced by the
criminal is so large as to deter him. SeeGary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
.31.
infringement, reduce the level of suchexpenditures, in much the same
way as the existence of legal penalties for theftreduces the level
of resources that people devote toprotecting their property from
thieves.
An interesting method ofreducing the social costs of monopoly is
used, perhaps unwittingly, by labor unions.The existence of a monopoly
wage might be expected to induce the expenditure ofmore and more
resources by workers seeking entry to theunion, until the expected
benefits of union membership were reducedto zero. However, unions
traditionally have rationed membership ina way that greatly reduces
the marginal benefits of expenditureson obtaining membership, and hence
the resources expended in thatpursuit, by conditioning membership on
a status that is difficult or impossible forthe job seeker to buy at
any price--such as being white, or the son ofa union member, or an
apprentice for seven years. --"Inthe limit, this method ofrationing
would reduce the elasticity of thesupply of inputs into obtaining
union membership, and hence the socialcosts of labor monopolies excluding
deadweight loss, to zero. Thus, the costs of labormonopolies may
belower than the costs of othertypes of monopoly, even for the
equivalent price increases and scale ofactivity, because other markets
in monopoly have not used suchefficient ()methodsof rationing
monopoly power.
40. The use of these methods by unions
is being increasingly limited
by government regulations designed toeliminate racial discrimination.32.. 8. One reason why most students of tax policy prefer Income
to excise taxes is that the misallocatlve effect of an Income tax
isassumed to be less than that of an excise tax: the cross—
elasticity of demand between work and leisure Is assumed to be lower
than that between a coninodity and its substitutes. Even if this Is
correct, it does not follow that the total social costs of collecting
a given amount ofrevenue by means of an income tax are lower than
those ofan excise tax. The amount of the tax transfer-—I in Figure




resources on trying to avoid the tax until, at the margin, cost and
gain are equated. The critical question in comparing the costs of
income and excise taxation, therefore, is the shape and location of
the marginal cost curves for avoiding income tax liability and excise
tax liability, respectively. In the case of a highly progressive
income tax system in which expenses for the production of income are
MC.
S33.
ductible, the comparison is likely to be distinctly unfavorable to
income taxation. Imagine that the marginal income tax rate in the
highest bracket is 90 per cent (as it once was in this country).
Then the taxpayer will continue expending resources on tax avoidance
until the expected value of a dollar so expended falls below ten
cents; conceivably, he might spend as much as ten times his tax
liability in order to reduce that liability to zero. How much he
would actually spend would depend on the location and shape of the
supply surve for avoidance, but, as shown in Figure 7, his expendi-
tures could easily exceed his tax liability (the I of Figure 6).
Qu4ib C0cO01(LJof 0b1 O j$CO,I)
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Thisanalys4not conclusive against the income tax. It might
be possible to increase the private marginal costs of avoidance by





problem would be to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate avoidance S
efforts. The point remains that no general presumption that
excise taxation is less costly than income taxation can be derived
from an analysis limited to the allocative costs of taxation, corres-
ponding to the deadweight losses of monopoly.
.
41.One would hardly want to punish everyone who believed that some
provision of the Internal Revenue Code was not intended to apply
to his activity.
.